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Irony has always been a rather elusive philosophical concept and thus to a 
certain extent ignored by philosophy. Kierkegaard’s treatment of this subject 
in his thesis The Concept of Irony is an attempt to define the term and place it 
within the framework of world history. By doing so he tries to establish the 
point at which irony first made its appearance in history with Socrates. Both 
Hegel and Kierkegaard agree that the Socratic standpoint was essentially a 
negative one, but Hegel according to Kierkegaard confused Socratic irony with 
that of Plato and misunderstood the Socratic method which was not ‘to cause 
the abstract to become visible, but the other way around: namely, to cause the 
concrete actuality to become abstract.
Kierkegaard claims that the favorite Socratic negative principle “I know 
nothing” was used by him in a totally negative way -  not in order to start a 
discussion and arrive at something -  but rather as an end in itself. We see this 
in the favorite Socratic procedure of asking questions. According to Kierkegaard 
the purpose of asking questions may be twofold,
“One may ask a question for the purpose of obtaining an answer containing 
the desired content, so that the more one questions, the deeper and more 
meaningful becomes the answer; or one may ask a question, not in the interest 
of obtaining an answer, but to suck out the apparent content with a question 
and leave only an emptiness remaining. The first method naturally presup­
poses a content, the second an emptiness; The first is the speculative the 
second the ironic. Now it was the latter method which was especially 
practiced by Socrates.”1
Furthermore, Socrates, by making virtue a product of knowledge and vice of 
lack of knowledge, dispensed with custom and passion.
He wanted to substitute the concrete ethic of old Hellenism with a subjective 
moral code, which meant that now anybody should be free in terms of obeying 
the laws of the state as such only if he found them reasonable. It is easy to see 
how the Greek state must have felt threatened by Socrates since he never arrived 
at “an idea of the state” with its quite specific privileges destined for the sur­
vival of both the state and the individual. By freeing each individual from his 
customary obligations vis-a-vis the state, he took away the concrete relationship 
between the citizen and the state and substituted for it a vague subjective 
determinism. It is clear then that Socrates freed the individual but in a negative 
way, he offered nothing concrete in the place of a concrete ethic. “The subject 
is thus negatively free” says Kierkegaard. He also maintained that Socrates, 
by implicitly threatening the state and by refusing to defend himself, became 
a sacrifice to the historical process but was later vindicated by history with 
the decline of Hellenism. His death however was not tragic but ironic seen 
from the standpoint of Socrates since death presented itself to him as a totally 
unknown quantity and therefore could neither be feared nor desired. His 
punishment was absurd because it was no punishment at all seen from his 
point of view.
I hope to show that Julien Sorel, the protagonist of Stendhal's The Red and 
the Black is a fictional creation, equivalent to the historical character of Socrates 
and used in the same way as he was, as a historical sacrifice to the irony implicit 
in the world historical proces. As a consequence I will try to clarify and elaborate 
what Kierkegaard means by irony, and how he visualizes the process of history.
Kierkegaard distinguishes between two different species of irony. One of 
these directs itself towards this or that particular subject the other is directed 
towards the whole of existence. It is the latter that I am interested in, since it 
comes close to the standpoint of Julien Sorel, who is at war with society as a 
whole -  both his own class and those above him -  and uses irony in order to 
overcome particular obstacles. One might even say that Juliens relationship to 
the world is ironic from the very beginning when he copes with his brutal 
father by turning himself into a miniature Tartufe, in order to avoid his father's 
blows. In his role as Tartufe however, he has been deprived of great models, 
at least in the beginning. Later on when he becomes aware of the different 
structures within society both in Verriere and in Paris, his irony assumes a much 
more mordant and sophisticated character.
Kierkegaard holds that “either the ironist identifies himself with the nuisance
he wishes to attack, or he enters into a relation of opposition to it, but in such 
a way, of course, that he is always conscious that the appearence is the opposite 
of what he himself subscribes to, and that he experiences a satisfaction in this 
disparity.”2
It is the latter kind Julien employs when dealing with the prude Madame 
de Fervaques. But in this instance what distinguishes him from a professional 
ironist is the fact that he does not take much pleasure in his role, even though 
it is well-played as the following quotation shows, as well as useful in terms 
of getting Mathilde de la Mole back.
“Quelquefois elle se flattait de mépriser ce jeune homme si triste; mais 
malgré elle, sa conversation la captivait Ce qui l’étonnait surtout, c’était sa 
fausseté parfaite; il ne disait pas un mot a la maréchale qui ne fût un men­
songe, ou du moins undéguisement abominable de sa façon de penser, que 
Mathilde connaissait si parfaitement sur presque tout les sujets.
Ce machiavélisme la frappait. Quelle profondeur! se disait-elle; quelle 
différence avec les nigauds emphatiques ou les fripons cummuns, tels que 
M. Tanbeau, qui tiennent le même langage!”3 
We have here dramatic irony in all its enticing charm, shared by Julien and 
Mathilde, directed against Madame de Fervaques.
Both Hegel and Kierkegaard feel that irony is a negative concept. Hegel, 
according to Kierkegaard, when he writes about irony is mostly affected by that 
kind of irony closest to him in history -  post-Fichtian irony which he rightly 
loathes but which prevents him from seeing the whole concept. When Kierke­
gaard writes that in irony the subject is negatively free the following quotation 
will suggest what he means by being positively or negatively bound by speech. 
“When next I consider the speaking subject, I again have a determination 
in all forms of irony, namely, the subject is negatively free. If I am conscious 
when I speak that what I say is my meaning, and that what is said is an 
adequate expression for my meaning, and I assume that the person with 
whom I am speaking comprehends perfectly the meaning in what is said, 
then I am bound by what is said, that is, I am here positively free. Here 
applies the ancient line: semel emissum volat mevocabtle verbum. Further­
more, I am bound in relation to myself and cannot detach myself whenever 
I choose. If, on the other hand, what is said is not my meaning, or the opposite 
of my meaning, then I am free both in relation to others and in relation to 
myself.”4
In irony the essence and the phenomenon seem as if they are not identical. If 
on the other hand, the ironist supposes that the listener understands him then 
the phenomenon and the essence are identical, but indirectly.
The ironist (I here include Julien) is continually conscious of the gap between 
the ideal and actuality and by using irony lifts himself above reality into the 
realm of the absolute. Julien is already at eighteen conscious of the idea of a 
more just and ideal state, which he has been able to deduce from Rousseau’s 
Confessions, and from the old military doctor, who makes Julien yearn for 
the Napoleonic era, in which merit was placed above inherited privileges. It is 
important to understand that the ironist usually despises and as far as possible 
withdraws from it into the realm of the absolute, where he sees everything as 
possibility and nothing mundane is allowed to drag him down.
“But the outstanding feature of irony in these and similar instances is the 
subjective freedom which at every moment has within its power the pos­
sibility of a beginning and is not generated from previous conditions. There 
is something seductive about every beginning because the subject is still free, 
and this is the satisfaction the ironist longs for. At such moments actuality 
loses its validity for him; he is free and above it.”5 
Similarly we see Juliens irritation when his friend Fouque offers him an 
advantageous partnership in his business. Here Julien is suddenly dragged from 
his Napoleonic heights into a situation which presents a choice. “Pour Julien 
offre de Fouque lui avait en effet enlevé tout bonheur: il ne pouvait s’arrêter 
à aucun parti.”6
If I am maintaining that Julien as a fictional character becomes a sacrifice 
to the irony of world history, in the same way as Socrates as a historic figure 
it is necessary to understand how Kierkegaard imagines the evolution of history 
and the part irony plays in it.
If the ironist, as Kierkegaard claims, in a certain way anticipates the future 
by negating the present and responding to it ironically, then I think it is neces­
sary to understand that the ironist chooses to build his castles in Spain either 
in a more ideal past or, as Kierkegaard maintains, in the future. In terms of 
Julien it is only natural that he should be attracted to the more opportunistic, 
more glorious and slightly more democratic society of Napoleon and view the 
present actuality as an unwelcome interruption of historic progress which can 
only be restored by a new revolution. And Julien would play an active role in 
that revolution since military action clearly holds a fascination for him. His
remark to the failed revolutionary Altamira shows that he is certainly made of 
revolutionary material. The question discussed is whether one is justified in a 
revolution to kill a few people in order to save the rest. Julien replies, “Ma foi! 
dit Julien, qui veut la fin veut les moyens; si, au lieu d 'être un atome, j’avais 
quelque pouvoir, je ferais pendre trois hommes pour sauver la vie à quatre. 
Ses yeux exprimaient le feu de la conscience et le mépris des vain jugements 
des hommes .. .”7 It should also be noted that one of the things that attracts 
Mathilde to Julien is the fact that he is the only one among her friends who 
incarnates a new revolution, as a possibility. “Is he going to become another 
Danton?”8 is a question which is present in Mathildes mind.
The basis for Kierkegaard’s view of world historical irony is Hegel’s concept 
from Geschichte der Philosophie (XVIII, 62): ‘All dialectic accepts as valid, 
what shall become valid as if it were valid, and allows the internal destruction 
to develop within it. Such is the universal irony of the world.’ Each particular 
historical actuality is then seen as a moment in the actualization of the Idea, 
it bears within it the seeds of its own dissolution. In order to illustrate this one 
might use the example of Socrates again, who employed irony in order to 
destroy old Hellenism and help the new assert itself. Kierkegaard uses the 
example of John the Baptist, who himself was not “the one to come” and did 
not understand that which was to come, yet he destroyed Judaism through itself 
by demanding that it should give that which it professed to give, namely 
righteousness. When Judaism was unable to give that which was demanded 
of it, it perished and John indirectly made room for the advent of Christ. The 
same happened with the arrival of hte Reformation, when Catholicism had lost 
its validity for many people, who wanted to replace it with a truer actuality. 
Although Kierkegaard is basicly in agreement with Hegel as to the dialectic 
aspect of world history and the role irony playes in it, he draws an analogy be­
tween the negative in Hegel’s system and irony in historical actuality.
It seems to me that the role of the ironist as seen by Kierkegaard is close to 
that of a midwife, who helps the new to come forth, without exactly realizing 
the nature of this new. Kierkegaard here makes a distinction between the role 
of a prophet and that of the ironist. For the prophetic individual actuality has 
also lost its validity when he is lost in prophetic visions, but his relation to 
actuality is usually not problematic since he seemingly goes hand in hand with 
his time, in such a way that actuality is not aware of any opposition.
Next Kierkegaard mentions the authentic tragic hero and here is where
Julien belongs, one for whom the given actuality has completely lost its validity. 
He does not possess the new but knows that the present does not correspond 
to the idea. He is different from the prophet by virtue of the fact that he has 
opened a front against actuality. And that front is irony. According to Kierke­
gaard an ironist does not have to proceed ironically. But Julien does proceed 
ironically; even his relations with Madame de Renal are tinged with irony after 
he discovers her contempt and displeasure when confronted with his enthusiasm 
for Napoleon.
In the end, when he is condemned Julien refuses to proceed ironically and 
this is precisely why society destroys him. But before he reaches that point he is 
almost totally estranged from society, “La position morale où il avait été toute 
sa vie se renouvelait chez M. le maire de Verrière. Là comme à la scierie de son 
père, il méprisait profondément les gens avec qui il vivait, et en était haï . . . ” 
De la vie, il n’avait parlé avec sincérité qu’au vieux chirurgien-major; .. .9
Kierkegaard maintains that, “The ironist is also a sacrifice required by the 
world process, not strictly speaking as if he needed to fall as a sacrifice, but 
zeal in the service of the world spirit consumes him.”10 This is: also true of Julien, 
who chooses to become a sacrifice as opposed to other possibilities -  to bribe 
the warden and escape, a spectacular conversion -  or follow one of Mathilde’s 
schemes. By adressing the following words to the judges, Julien quite know­
ingly commits suicide,
“Messieurs les jurés,
“L’horreur de mépris que je croyais pouvoiur braver au moment de la mort, 
me fait prendre la parole. Messieurs, je n’ai point l’honneur d’appartenir à 
votre classe, vous voyez en moi un paysan qui s’est révolté contre la bassesse 
de la fortune.
Je ne vous demande aucune grâce . . .
Voilà mon crime, Messieurs, et il sera puni avec d’autant plus de sévérité, 
que, dans le fait, je ne suis point jugé par mes pairs. Je ne vois point sur les 
bancs des jurés quelque paysan enrichi, mais uniquement des bourgeois 
indignés.. .”n
We see here that Julien no longer proceeds ironically vis-a-vis society. But 
there is still the author’s irony. By creating a situation in which dramatic irony 
suddenly becomes visible by virtue of the fact that although Julien tells the 
judges nothing but the truth he nevertheless does not express the whole truth; 
namely his profound hatred of the people condemning him. That hatred he
shares only with the reader. Socrates on the other hand who shares Juliens 
contempt for his judges continues to proceed ironically before the Athenian 
court and thus almost teases them into condemning him to death. Kierkegaard 
has mentioned that one might deduce Socrates’ view of his judges from different 
statements made in the Gorgias, of which the following will suffice.
‘And what I said to Polus can easily be applied to me, for I shall be judged 
as a physician would be judged who was summoned before a court of little boys 
on a charge brought by a cook’ (52IE).12
Kierkegaard holds that the Apology which describes Socrates’ “defence” is 
clearly ironic since Socrates does not defend himself at all and uses the occasion 
to get the best of his accusers. The suggestion that he should be maintained at 
prytaneum or be fined as a punishment is of course ironic. Although he proceeds 
ironically in front of his judges, his view of death as such is not ironic. Kierke­
gaard says that when Socrates claims he knows nothing, he is deadly serious. 
But death for Socrates does not contain a threat since he is only curious about 
the transition from one state to another. Furthermore he would be equally satis­
fied with the cessation of consciousness as well as a life in Hades in which he 
would continue to converse with wise men in order to expose the ones who are 
not truly wise. As an ironist he would be perfectly satisfied with nothingness. 
Thus the death of Socrates could not be called tragic, but is an absurd sacrifice.
For the tragic hero, however, death is something like a giant obstacle, which 
he has to come to terms with and which ultimately requires all his ingenuity 
and strength because he knows it is a suffering. His death therefore becomes 
a sacrifice to history.
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